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A fundamental overhaul of EU economic governance is needed. The most important reform 
is a strengthening of national fiscal frameworks, including the establishment of independent 
fiscal watchdogs in Member States that do not yet have such institutions. At the European 
level, a permanent crisis resolution mechanism should be integrated with both broader 
macroeconomic surveillance and the sanction system. An independent European fiscal 
council could, based on macroeconomic risk considerations, decide in advance appropriate 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The Commission has proposed a number of reforms of EU economic governance. They 
include strengthening of the EU fiscal rules, broader macroeconomic surveillance, better 
connect between the policy processes at the European level and the national level, and 
strengthening of national fiscal frameworks. Reforms proposed in all these areas are 
desirable. But as fiscal policy is a national prerogative, the most important reforms would 
concern national fiscal frameworks. Such reforms should include (i) well-defined fiscal 
objectives; (ii) ex-ante guidelines for the use of fiscal policy as a stabilisation tool; (iii) 
commitments to transparency; and (iv) stronger incentives to adhere to national targets. 
       The incentives for fiscal discipline can be strengthened by setting up fiscal watchdogs 
(fiscal policy councils), as has been done in some countries. These institutions should be 
truly independent from Governments with a clear separation of tasks from Ministries of 
Finance. They could be given narrow tasks of only fiscal monitoring or broader tasks, 
involving also evaluations of employment and growth policies, depending on the specific 
traditions and institutional environment of the country. The Commission and the Ecofin 
Coucil could help boost the standing of such watchdogs by regularly asking their views 
when evaluating Stability and Convergence Programmes. 
       One could also conceive of an independent fiscal policy council at the European level. 
It could be used for evaluating that national fiscal frameworks meet certain minimum 
standards. It could also engage in broader macroeconomic surveillance, which must be 
more judgemental than pure fiscal surveillance and which therefore is exposed to even 
larger risks of political interference. 
              The main risk with current reform initiatives is that they will merely represent 
tinkering with the present rules and will therefore result in a complex and non-transparent 
system which does not command enough legitimacy. Instead, there should be a 
fundamental overhaul of EU economic governance to address the “new facts on the ground” 
established by the financial emergency measures to deal with the sovereign debt crisis. 
Such a reform should integrate a permanent financial crisis resolution mechanism with the 
systems of sanctions and macroeconomic surveillance.  
       A  permanent  crisis  resolution  mechanism should allow for the possibility of orderly 
restructuring of government debt where lenders might have to take a haircut on their 
claims. The size of haircuts in the event of restructuring could be determined in advance by 
an independent European fiscal council on the basis of macroeconomic surveillance. The 
council could be explicitly instructed to take pre-emptive action and signal risks to financial 
markets through differentiation of the size of potential future haircuts with the aim of 
inducing early market reactions. Fines and other financial sanctions should be transformed 
into insurance fees going into a crisis resolution fund, which would boost their legitimacy.   3
Measures should also be taken to increase the probability that the sanctions are used (the 
insurance fees paid). This could involve loss of voting power in the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure for all countries deemed to have excessive deficits and/or larger automaticity of 
enforcement steps (a requirement of a qualified majority to stop further steps rather than 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The sovereign debt crises in the euro area have created an awareness of the need 
for reform of EU economic governance. Preliminary proposals have been made by 
both the Commission and the van Rompuy Task Force and have been endorsed by 
the European Council.
1 Inputs have been provided by both the ECB and Member 
State Governments.
2 There is also a vivid ongoing public debate. 
            EU economic governance is obviously in shambles. This was clear already 
before the onset of the economic crisis, as there were earlier frequent violations of 
the fiscal rules. The Stability Pact was also weakened significantly in 2005. But the 
emergency measures to deal with the acute sovereign debt crises signal a 
complete wreckage of the system. The ad-hoc creation of the European Financial 
Stability Mechanism means in effect a cancellation of the no-bail-out clause. The 
ECB’s purchases of debt of crisis-ridden governments amount to de-facto financing 
of their deficits. Although probably unavoidable in the situation that arose, the 
emergency measures imply serious moral-hazard problems and a further 
weakening of early market signals, the main remaining disciplining force after the 
loosening of the Stability Pact. 
              There has emerged a consensus on the causes of the current public debt 
crisis.
3 These include: 
  A failure in several countries to observe the fiscal rules. The violations range 
from outright fraud in Greece to budget deficits that in good times stayed 
too close to the three-per-cent-of-GDP ceiling and insufficient reduction of 
government debt in others like Italy, Portugal and France. 
  Severe macroeconomic imbalances, involving excessive credit creation, real 
estate price bubbles, overexpansion of the construction sector, and strong 
real exchange rate appreciations in especially Ireland and Spain. Although 
these countries entered the recession with fiscal surpluses and low 
government debt, the scope for deterioration of the fiscal position turned out 
to be huge. 
  Lax bank regulation with too small capital buffers which forced governments 
to transform private debt into public debt when the financial crisis struck. 
Ireland and the UK are prime examples. 
                                                 
11 See European Commission (2010a, 2010b), van Rompuy (2010a, 2010b) and the European Council (2010). 
2 See ECB (2010) and, for example, Swedish Ministry of Finance (2010) and European economic governance 
(2010). 
3 See the references in footnotes 1 and 2 as well as Baldwin and Gros (2010).   5
 
There has also developed a fair amount of consensus on appropriate governance 
reforms. The ingredients can be summarised as follows: 
1.  Strengthening of EU fiscal rules. 
2.  More comprehensive macroeconomic surveillance. 
3.  Addressing the disconnect between the policy processes at the European 
level and the national level. 
4.  Strengthening of national fiscal frameworks. 
 
A pertinent question is whether the various reform avenues are complements or 
substitutes. In view of the severity of the fiscal problems, there is a strong case for 
viewing them as complements, that is to make reforms in all four areas. But the 
most important reform is probably the establishment of strong fiscal frameworks at 
the national level, as fiscal policy is still – and will for the foreseeable future remain 
– a national prerogative. 
            Sections 2-5 discuss the four sets of reforms listed above. This discussion 
mainly comments on proposals advanced in the ongoing EU policy process. Section 
6 analyses the role that independent fiscal institutions could play. Section 7 
focuses on the need for a permanent crisis resolution mechanism and how that 
could be coordinated with the Stability Pact as well as with broader macroeconomic 
surveillance. Section 8 concludes. My discussion is relevant mainly for the Member 
States which have adopted the euro, although parts of it apply also to Member 
States which have not. 
 
2. STRENGTHENING THE FISCAL RULES 
At the national level, experiences with the EU fiscal rules have been characterised 
by frequent breaches of the deficit ceiling as well as by significant deviations from 
the medium-term fiscal objectives, resulting in insufficient reductions of debt levels 
in good times. At the European level, there has been a reluctance to follow 
stipulated procedures in general and to apply sanctions in particular. In 2005 a 
major loosening of the Stability Pact was undertaken with the aim of 
accommodating French and German violations of it.
4 
              The reluctance in the Ecofin Council to make full use of the enforcement 
mechanisms in the Stability Pact has several causes: a general bias to avoid 
                                                 
4 See Calmfors (2005).   6
political conflicts, collusion among Member States simultaneously breaching the 
rules, “strategic awareness” among current non-violators that lenient treatment of 
violators likely increases the chances of lenient treatment for the own country if it 
were to breach the rules in the future, and insufficient legitimacy for sanctions 
(possibly because of their harshness). 
       The Commission has proposed reforms along several lines: 
  Faster progress towards the medium-term fiscal objectives for high-debt 
Member States (preventive arm of the Stability Pact). 
  G r e a t e r  e m p h a s i s  o n  t h e  d e b t  c r i t e r i o n ,  s u c h  t h a t  M e m b e r  S t a t e s  w i t h  
debts in excess of 60 per cent of GDP not meeting a well-defined 
benchmark for debt reduction should be subject to the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure even if they comply with the deficit ceiling (corrective arm of the 
Stability Pact). 
  A wider set of sanctions against violators of the rules which should set in 
already at an early stage. This broader range of sanctions could include 
interest-bearing deposits and reductions in payments from the EU budget. 
Such sanctions would be used not only in the Pact’s corrective arm, but 
also in its preventive arm. 
 
The proposed changes are reasonable. But some comments are warranted. 
       Earlier and more gradual sanctions would likely increase the probability that 
the sanctions are used. But a potential problem with the proposed widening of the 
sanction possibilities is that they are complex and involve many systems, including 
different parts of the EU budget. This is the consequence of the ambition to make 
reforms without Treaty revisions. A simpler and more transparent system would 
have benefits from a legitimacy point of view. A feature of the current sanction 
system that one should do away with is its front-loading: if non-interest-bearing 
deposits and fines are used, they will be larger in the first year they apply than 
later (because there is a fixed component – in addition to a variable component – 
in the first year which disappears in later years).
5 This front-loading works as a 
disincentive to use the sanctions because once applied they immediately become 
very harsh. 
                                                 
5 As long as excessive deficits are below seven per cent of GDP, the deposit/fine is larger in the first year (which is 
the only one when payment of a fixed amount of 0.2 per cent of GDP is required) than in subsequent years (when 
only payment of the variable amount of 0.1 per cent of GDP for each percentage point’s excess of the deficit above 
three per cent of GDP is required). See Calmfors (2005).   7
      An important element in the weakening of the Stability Pact in 2005 was the 
introduction of possibilities to extend the deadlines for correcting an excessive 
deficit. These changes make it possible to prolong the time after identification of an 
excessive deficit before non-interest-bearing deposits and fines have to be paid 
from three and five years, respectively, up to seven and nine years, respectively.
6 
De cisions on this are to be ba se d on a consideration of “other re levant factors” 
which include factors deemed important “in the opinion of the Member State 
concerned”. These factors are exemplified with rubber formulations that open up 
for arbitrary interpretations.
7 It is noteworthy that the recent Commission 
communications on stronger EU economic governance does not address this issue.
8 
It would send a strong message that future enforcement is to be more rules-based 
if one did away with the possibilities to extend deadlines based on arbitrary 
criteria. 
       Reforms ought also to involve the decision-making procedures in the Ecofin 
Council, as the earlier lax enforcement has been due to an unwillingness to use the 
instruments available. Two possibilities immediately suggest themselves. A first 
one is to deprive Member States with excessive deficits of their voting rights in the 
Excessive Deficit Procedures against other Member States. This would make it 
impossible for Member States with excessive deficits to form coalitions that block 
further enforcement steps, as happened in the past. A more radical approach is to 
revert to the original German proposals on the Stability Pact from the 1990s, 
according to which sanctions would be automatic unless there is a qualified 
majority against them (instead of as today requiring a qualified majority in favour). 
Both these reforms would require Treaty changes. 
 
3. BROADER MACROECONOMIC SURVEILLANCE 
The Commission has also proposed that macroeconomic surveillance should be 
broadened. The idea is to set up a mechanism modelled on the Stability Pact, thus 
including both a preventive arm with the aim of identifying macroeconomic 
imbalances and a corrective arm to enforce the elimination of such imbalances. The 
preventive arm would include an alert mechanism based on a scoreboard of 
indicators. These could include the current account balance, the net foreign asset 
                                                 
6 See Calmfors (2005). 
7 The factors include ”budgetary efforts towards increasing or maintaining at a high level financial contributions to 
fostering international solidarity and to achieving European policy goals, notably the unification of Europe if it has 
a detrimental effect on the growth and fiscal burden of a Member State” (Council Regulation 1056/2005). 
8 European Commission (2010a, 2010b).   8
position, the real exchange rate, private debt and asset prices. The corrective arm 
would include an Excessive Imbalances Procedure, where non-compliance with 
Council recommendations would trigger intensified surveillance and be “an 
aggravating factor in the fiscal assessment under the Stability and Growth Pact”.
9 
       The  need  for  broader  macroeconomic surveillance i s  o b v i o u s .  T h e  
Commission’s proposals are a late, but welcome, recognition of the gravity of the 
asymmetric-shocks problem emphasised in the research on optimal currency areas. 
It has been a futile hope that a common currency would automatically lead to such 
convergence that serious asymmetric shocks would disappear. On the contrary, 
past developments, especially in Ireland and Spain, illustrate clearly how 
unsustainable booms in individual economies can sow the seeds of macroeconomic 
deteriorations that quickly turn perceived sustainable public finances into 
unsustainable ones. 
              A few words or warning are, however, warranted. Evaluations of the fiscal 
risks arising from macroeconomic imbalances will always be of a judgemental 
character. These evaluations cannot be based on precise numerical values in the 
same way as evaluations of compliance with the fiscal rules. Hence, it is not 
advisable to set up a financial sanctions system linked to “excessive imbalances” as 
suggested by the ECB.
10 One should also avoid that broader macroeconomic 
surveillance introduces a larger discretionary element into the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure, as the main problem with it has been too much discretion. 
 
4. ADRESSING THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN AND THE 
NATIONAL LEVEL 
An easily identifiable problem with EU fiscal surveillance is the disconnect to the 
fiscal policy debate at the national level. In ordinary times, EU concerns do not 
seem to influence the fiscal policy discussion much in most Member States. 
Stability and Convergence Programmes appear more as an ex-post account of 
policy than as an integrated part of the domestic policy formation process.  
       The  Commission’s  proposal  of  a European Semester is designed to address 
this problem by devising an annual cycle where (i) the Commission and the 
European Council provide strategic guidance; (ii) this guidance is taken into 
account when Member States formulate their Stability (Convergence) Programmes 
                                                 
9 European Commission (2010b). 
10 ECB (2010).   9
and National Reform Programmes; (iii) the Council issues country-specific guidance 
on the basis of these programmes; and (iv) Member States finalise their national 
budgets in the last step of this process.  
       A European Semester would increase interaction between the European level 
and the national level. An important point is the need of a highly visible domestic 
arena where the European and national levels can meet. Such an arena could be 
created if EU-level orientations for national policy were to be presented – by, for 
example, the President of the Euro Group or the Chair of the Ecofin Council – in 
national Parliaments and subjected to open hearings there in a way such that these 
presentations become important events in the national policy discussion. 
 
5. STRONGER NATIONAL FISCAL FRAMEWORKS 
European macroeconomic surveillance can – and should – be improved. But as 
economic policy is still mainly decided nationally, stronger national fiscal policy 
institutions are of paramount importance. Without them, efforts at the European 
level are likely to fail, as in the past. For this reason, the most important 
Commission proposals are the ones on strengthening national fiscal frameworks. It 
is desirable to set minimum standards for such national frameworks at the 
European level and monitor that the standards are respected. There is much to 
suggest that common rules on the design of institutions are more easily accepted 
than decisions on actual policies (an obvious example is the requirement of 
independence of central banks, which applies also to the Member States which 
have not adopted the euro). 
      National fiscal frameworks should have four main ingredients:
11 
  Well-defined fiscal objectives. They should include a multi-year objective for 
the fiscal balance or the development of government debt and preferably 
also expenditure ceilings, the motivation being that deficit problems usually 
originate on the expenditure side.  
  Ex-ante guidelines for how fiscal policy should be used as a stabilisation tool. 
They should specify to what extent fiscal policy to stabilise the business 
cycle should rely on the automatic stabilisers and to what extent on 
discretionary action. To shorten decision lags in acute situations, it may be 
desirable also to specify in advance which fiscal instruments are to be used. 
Such guidelines are particularly important in booms, as it may be 
                                                 
11 This reasoning has been elaborated in SOU 2002:16 and Calmfors (2003, 2005).   10
particularly difficult then to reach political agreement on appropriate 
measures. 
  Commitments to transparency to guarantee adequate statistical reporting as 
well as to prevent that creative accounting and one-off transactions are used 
to mask deficits. An obligation for governments to indicate clearly in advance 
which fiscal measures are undertaken for temporary stabilisation purposes 
and which are undertaken for other reasons would also be helpful. 
  Incentives to avoid deviations from policy objectives. A recently much 
discussed method is to build in countervailing powers in the decision-making 
process through the establishment of independent fiscal watchdogs. This is 
discussed in the next section. 
 
6. INDEPENDENT FISCAL INSTITUTIONS
12 
Several countries have recently set up independent fiscal watchdogs (fiscal policy 
councils is the label used in the academic literature). Sweden (2007), Canada 
(2008), Hungary (2008), Slovenia (2009) and the UK (2010) are examples. Similar 
institutions existed already before in the Netherlands, Denmark, the US, Belgium 
and Austria. The exact tasks vary but could include: 
  The provision of “objective” macroeconomic forecasts on which government 
budget proposals are to be based.  
  Costing of various government policy initiatives.  
  Ex-ante evaluation of whether fiscal policy is likely to meet its medium-term 
targets.  
  Ex- post evaluation of whether fiscal policy has met its targets.  
  Analysis of the long-run sustainability of fiscal policy.  
  Normative recommendations on fiscal policy.  
 
A fiscal watchdog can help increase public awareness of the future costs of current 
deficits and to offset tendencies to overoptimism and overconfidence by 
highlighting historical examples and providing analysis of the sensitivity of budget 
calculations to various risks. By increasing fiscal transparency, a watchdog makes 
governments more accountable to the electorate. Independent monitoring could be 
seen as a complement to fiscal rules: it is likely to increase the reputation cost of 
deviating from them. At the same time, elaborate monitoring by an independent 
                                                 
12 This section builds mainly on Calmfors (2010a, 2010b).   11
institution could allow the rules to be more flexible, permitting more contingencies: 
such monitoring makes it less necessary for a government to earn credibility 
through mechanical application of simple and more easily observed rules. 
       Member States that do not have independent fiscal watchdogs would be well 
advised to establish such institutions.
13 Doing this, a number of considerations are 
important: 
  The watchdogs must be truly independent of the political sphere. This could 
be achieved through long and non-renewable terms of office for council 
members, a long-term budget, and a clear separation from the Ministry of 
Finance with own staff and no obligations (rather a prohibition) to provide 
in-house input to the Ministry.
14 
  The majority of council members should be academics, since they are mainly 
active in another arena than the political one (where the reputation cost of 
being seen to be politically biased is huge) and not dependent on it for their 
careers. The inclusion also of ex-politicians, preferably earlier Ministers of 
Finance, with their political careers behind them could contribute to the 
public standing of a watchdog.
15 
  In the long term, a fiscal watchdog can gain credibility only through building 
a reputation for unbiased, high-quality analysis. But to get a head start it is 
important that governments show that they take them seriously. To the 
extent that governments are criticised they may have a strong incentive to 
downplay the views of the watchdogs. One way of boosting their credibility 
would be for the Commission and/or the Ecofin Council to regularly ask the 
views of the national fiscal watchdogs when evaluating Stability and 
Convergence Programmes.  
  Since both historical traditions and institutional set-ups vary among 
countries, the precise tasks of independent fiscal institutions should be 
adapted to the circumstances of each country: there is no unique optimal 
model. Among existing institutions, the remits vary from very broad 
macroeconomic ones (including analysis of employment and other structural 
                                                 
13 See Fatás and Mihov (2010), Lane (2010) and Wyplosz (2010) for recent proposals. See also, for example, 
Calmfors (2003, 2005). 
14 The recent debate on the newly established Office for Budget Responsibility in the UK illustrates the dangers of 
insufficient separation from the Ministry of Finance (Calmfors 2010c). 
15 For example, the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council is made up of two ex-politicians in addition to six academics 
(Calmfors 2010a, 2010b).   12
policies in the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden) to more narrow fiscal 
ones (as in, for example, Hungary and the UK).
16  
 
There have also been proposals to set up an independent fiscal council at the 
European level.
17 One idea would be to let such an institution monitor that national 
fiscal frameworks meet certain minimum standards. In addition, a European fiscal 
council might have a role to play in broader macroeconomic surveillance (possibly 
with an input from national councils). Such surveillance must be of a judgemental 
character and is therefore exposed to larger risks of political interference than pure 
fiscal surveillance, which can be more rules-based. If such an independent 
European watchdog were to be set up, it should be placed outside the Commission 
to avoid all suspicions of undue interference from it. 
 
7. A PERMANENT CRISIS RESOLUTION MECHANISM 
The need to handle the sovereign debt crisis has created an untenable situation. 
On the one hand, there is the no-bail-out clause in the Treaty. On the other hand, 
the ad-hoc establishment of the European Financial Stability Facility is a clear 
breach of the clause. The initial mistake behind the no-bail-out clause was the 
belief that if a euro country were threatened by default, it would be alone. In such 
a situation the no-bail-out clause was credible. But in a situation with widespread 
financial distress and sovereign debt problems, it is not. A default in an individual 
country could then cause systemic financial collapse. 
       Since soverign debt crises are obviously possible in the eurozone, there is a 
need for a permanent crisis resolution mechanism. It should balance moral-hazard 
risks against risks of systemic financial collapse. To this end, it should allow the 
possibility of orderly restructuring of debt. At the same time, there would be a 
great advantage from the legitimacy point of view if the mechanism could be 
integrated with the macroeconomic surveillance at the European level and the 
sanction procedures. 
      The creation of a European Monetary Fund has been proposed by Gros and 
Meyer (2010).
18 According to the proposal, a defaulting country could apply for a 
swap of its debt against claims on the fund, which would then acquire the claims 
                                                 
16 In Sweden, the remit of the Fiscal Policy Council even includes examination of the clarity of the Government’s 
budget proposals and of the motivations given for policy initiatives. The Council thus acts also as  a “debate 
watchdog” with the aim of raising the quality of the economic policy discussion (Calmfors 2010a, 2010b).  
17 See, for example, ECB (2010) and Burda and Gerlach (2010). 
18 See also Mayer (2010) and Persaud (2010a, 2010b). ECB (2010) raises similar ideas but in less concrete form.   13
on the country from lenders. The swap would be made with a haircut. This means 
that lenders take losses, at the same time as there is an upper limit to the losses 
such that the risk of systemic collapse is reduced. The debt exchange would be 
allowed only under strict conditionality regarding fiscal consolidation in the 
defaulting country. 
       Such a permanent crisis facility could be linked to surveillance in two ways.   
1.  Stability Pact fines – and other new forms of financial sanctions as discussed 
in Section 2 – could go into the fund. This would address the legitimacy 
problem of the current sanction system, where it is not clear why other 
Member States would be allowed to “tax”, and thus aggravate the deficits, 
of those that already have severe fiscal problems. One should expect it to 
be much easier to get public acceptance for fines that can be regarded as 
insurance fees, the potential use of which would be more visible. Setting up 
such an insurance-based system, where financial sanctions are explicitly 
linked to risk considerations, would represent a complete overhaul of the 
current sanctions system and require a Treaty change. 
2.  Broader macroeconomic surveillance could be used to determine the 
amount of risk that lenders would have to take on. More explicitly, the size 
of haircuts on a Member State’s debt in the event of restructuring could be 
decided in advance based on judgements on macroeconomic imbalances. 
These judgements could preferably be made by an independent European 
fiscal policy council of the type discussed in the previous section, as the 
temptations for political decision-makers to make other considerations than 
purely economic ones would be huge. The council could be explicitly 
instructed to act pre-emptively, that is to decide in advance appropriate 
haircuts on a Member State’s sovereign debt (in the event of a future 
restructuring)  on the basis of long-term fiscal risk evaluations. The aim 
would be to signal risks to financial markets at an early stage and this way 
try to induce early market reactions. This could be seen as an attempt to let 
surveillance and market discipline interact in a more healthy way than is the 
case now.  
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
The Commission has proposed a number of reforms of EU economic governance. 
They include strengthening of the EU fiscal rules, broader macroeconomic   14
surveillance, better connect between the policy processes at the European level 
and the national level, and strengthening of national fiscal frameworks. Reforms in 
all these areas are desirable. But as fiscal policy is a national prerogative, the most 
important reforms would concern national fiscal frameworks. 
              The incentives for fiscal discipline can be strengthened by setting up fiscal 
watchdogs  (fiscal policy councils), as has been done in some countries. If such 
institutions are to be effective, they must be truly independent from Governments 
with a clear separation of tasks from Ministries of Finance. They could be given 
tasks of only fiscal monitoring or broader tasks involving also evaluations of 
employment and growth developments depending on the specific traditions, the 
institutional environment and the economic problems of the country. The 
Commission and the Ecofin Coucil could boost the standing of such watchdogs by 
regularly asking their views when evaluating Stability and Convergence 
Programmes. 
       One  could  also  conceive of an independent fiscal policy council at the 
European level. It could be used for monitoring that national fiscal frameworks 
meet certain minimum standards. It could also be engaged in broader 
macroeconomic surveillance, which must be more judgemental than pure fiscal 
surveillance and which therefore is exposed to even larger risk of political 
interference. 
       The main risk with current reform initiatives is that they will merely represent 
tinkering with the present rules and will therefore result in a complex and non-
transparent system. Instead, there should be a fundamental overhaul of EU 
economic governance to address the “new facts on the ground” established by the 
financial rescue measures to deal with the sovereign debt crisis. Such a reform 
should integrate a permanent financial crisis resolution mechanism with the 
systems of sanctions and macroeconomic surveillance.  
              A permanent crisis resolution mechanism should allow for the possibility of 
orderly restructuring of government debt where private lenders might have to take 
a haircut on their claims. The size of haircuts in the event of restructuring could be 
determined in advance by an independent European fiscal council on the basis of 
macroeconomic surveillance. The council could be explicitly instructed to take pre-
emptive action and signal risks to financial markets through differentiation of the 
size of potential future haircuts with the aim of inducing early market reactions. 
Fines and other financial sanctions should be transformed into insurance fees going   15
into a crisis resolution fund, which would boost their legitimacy. Measures should 
also be taken to increase the probability that the sanctions are used (the insurance 
fees paid). This could involve loss of voting power in the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure for all countries deemed to have excessive deficits and/or larger 
automaticity of enforcement steps (a requirement of a qualified majority to stop 
further steps rather than such a requirement to take them).  
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